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1.     Introduction  
Migration and associated policies have recently grown in importance as a 
consequence of Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEEC) accession to the 
European Union (EU).  Inter alia, immigration’s effect on the employment and real 
wages of Western Europe’s destination countries is an important issue that may 
involve government restrictions on inflows of potential migrants. Still, there are only 
a few studies trying to understand this important topic. This paper aims at achieving a 
better understanding of the effects of migration from the CEECs on the EU’s 
employment and real wages. 
 
The migration literature argues that the higher the perceived probability of finding a 
job and the higher the real wage in the host country the greater is the rate of migration 
(Ghatak et al. 1996; Harris and Todaro 1970). In terms of the impact of migration on 
the labour market in the host country, immigration during recession adds to 
unemployment either because migrants themselves are unemployed or because native 
workers are replaced by migrants. However, immigration may also increase aggregate 
expenditure via migrants’ own expenditures and capacity to increase real output by 
adding to the workforce (Withers and Pope 1985). The standard theory of the labour 
market predicts that an increase in labour supply exerts a downward pressure on 
wages. Indeed, the flexibility of the labour market is a major factor in understanding 
the impact of migration on employment and real wages. 
 
This paper investigates the interaction between migration and unemployment and also 
between migration and wages by applying Granger’s (1969) causality test to panel 
data on 13 old EU countries for the period 1980-2004. In this regard, it is worth 
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noting that investigation on the relationship between international migration and its 
impact on the EU’s real wages and unemployment is rather limited. Much of the 
empirical literature concentrates on countries like the USA, Australia and Canada, or 
on inter-regional migration in transitional economies (Andrienko and Guriev 2004; 
Ghatak et al. 2007).   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the theoretical 
relationship between migration and the labour market by focusing on the welfare 
impact of migration in terms of output and unemployment. Section 3 applies Granger 
panel causality tests to better understand the problem at hand.  Section 4 concludes. 
  
2.     A theoretical model of migration 
Our theoretical framework to explain migration is based on Harris and Todaro’s 
(1970) model of rural-urban migration, hereafter referred to as H-T.  Here, we replace 
the rural-urban with the East-West; East implies origin country of migrants, whereas 
West, the destination country of migrants.  The future expected income from 
migration is given by 
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where C is the direct cost of migration, r is the migrants’ discount rate, P is the 
probability of employment at real wage WW and Wb is the real income received if 
unemployed or employed in the informal sector. Would-be migrants compare (1) with 
the future income from remaining in the East 
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If employment is a certain prospect (i.e. P=1) then migration takes place only if there 
are gains from moving, i.e., only if 
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Under conditions of uncertainty, the probability of obtaining employment is given by 
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where L is population employed, N is total population and M is the rate of migrants 
coming from the East and the subscript W refers to the West while E refers to the East. 
The following equation (5) is derived assuming that equality holds in (3) 
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with P given by (4). Substituting (4) into (5) and solving for M gives the equilibrium 
migration rate M  
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We require that Eb WW  < rC for M > 0 which implies that there is an incentive for 
leaving the East for a West unemployment. 
 
From (6), we get the familiar results 
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The conditions in (7) state that marginal increases in the West wage (WW) or decreases 
in the East wage (WE) will increase migration. Paradoxically, any policy to increase 
employment in the advanced West will raise the migration rate and may increase 
unemployment in the West. Hence, as predicted in the H-T model, a policy of creating 
more employment opportunities in the developed counrties may end-up enlarging the 
migration from the backward countries. Also, any decrease in the cost of migration 
will increase M. Notably, the H-T model ignores the impact of human capital, 
availability of public goods like health care, housing stock and road infrastructure on 
migration decisions (for an alternative model, see Ghatak et al. 2007). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the migration equilibrium. The real wage/MPL is on the vertical 
axis and employment on the horizontal axis. Assuming the standard theory of 
employment determination, initial equilibria occur at G and H, respectively, where the 
bargained real wages are equal to the MPL in the East (the origin country) and the 
West (the destination country). Like the standard supply curve of labour, the 
bargained real wages (BRW) lines slope upwards (Layard et al. 1991).  Assume that 
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OA is the total labour force in East and West prior to migration which is equal.  
Hence, KA = AB would be equal to migration. Assuming real wage flexibility, the 
BRW in the West shifts to the right and employment rises by WW'. In the East, BRW 
shifts to left and employment falls by E'E. The net output gain is given by HJW'W - 
FGEE' the sign of which cannot be determined a priori. The net change in 
employment and output will clearly depend on the degree of shifts of the BRW curves 
in the West. Intuitively, if the labour market and real wages are flexible, the elasticity 
of real wages with respect to unemployment is high and the unemployment in the 
West is low, then migration can increase output and employment. On the other hand, 
if the labour market and the real wages in the West are rigid, and the elasticity of the 
real wages with respect to unemployment is low, then migration can mean loss of 
output and increase in unemployment (see Levine 1999).  Thus, the overall effect of 
migration on the job market of the destination country is indeterminate a priori. 
However, the actual measurement of the effect of migration on employment is of 
considerable research interest. Such an analysis will be undertaken in the next section. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
3.     Granger-Causality Tests for the EU using Heterogeneous Panels 
To examine the relationship between immigration and the real wages and employment 
in the EU from 1980 to 2004, we present all the data in logarithmic forms with the 
following notations: lmr = log(migration/population), lu = log(unemployment rate) 
and lrw = log(wage rates/prices).  The panel data consist of annual observations from 
1980 to 2004 (25 time series) for 13 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden 
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and the UK.  There is difficulty in obtaining the data for migration, and the choice of 
country is based on the criteria where more than 18 out of 25 time series are available 
for the migration data, providing a total of 283 observations.  The data for migration 
is taken from OECD (International Migration Statistics) for the earlier period 1980-84 
and Euro-stat for the period 1985-2004. Other data are taken from OECD (Main 
Economic Indicators)
 1
.   
 
We employ three types of panel unit root tests, namely of Levin et al. (2002), Im et al. 
(2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999).  Levin et al. (2002) assume that the coefficients 
on the lagged dependent variables are homogeneous across cross-sections, though 
incorporates a degree of heterogeneity by allowing for fixed effects and unit specific 
time trends.  The null and alternative are that the whole panel is nonstationary and 
stationary respectively.  In contrast, Im et al. (1997) allows for heterogeneity of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable with the slope coefficients to vary across 
cross-sections.  The null is that all series are nonstationary while the alternative is that 
the at least one cross-section is stationary.  The Fisher’s ADF test proposed by 
Maddala and Wu (1999) combines the p-values from individual unit root tests, and the 
test statistics are the asymptotic   See Table 1.  The variables in levels are found to 
be insignificant at the 5% level implying that they are non-stationary. The first 
                                               
1 Note that we use gross migration flows instead of net migration flows due to the data availability.  
Yet, in the study of Jaurez (2000) the variable of gross migration flows is found to perform better than 
that of net migration in estimation.  Also note that although immigrant inflows are small relative to the 
populations of most countries, recent immigrants are a significant fraction of total low-skilled workers, 
therefore measuring the effects of immigration at the lower tails of the wage distribution, rather than 
general wages may generate a different result.   
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difference of these variables rejects the null of unit root
2
.  It follows that the variables 
are characterised as integrated of order one.   
 
[TABLE 1] and [TABLE 2] 
 
For a panel cointegration test, Pedroni (1999) provides a framework for heterogenous 
panels by specifying fixed effects, heterogenous slope coefficients and individual 
specific deterministic trends.  The cointegration regression takes the following form 
without deterministic trends,      
titi
N
i
ii
N
i
iiti elmrddy ,,
01
,  

         (8) 
where y = lu, lrw, N = the number of individual members,  T = the number of 
observation,  e = error terms, di = 1 for country i, 0 otherwise.  The parameter i  is 
the country-specific intercept, implying fixed effects and i  indicates slope 
coefficients, which vary across individual countries.    
 
Following Pedroni (1999), we have constructed the asymptotic distributions of two 
panel cointegration statistics based on the residuals of the regression; one is 
parametric panel t-statistics and the other is parametric group t-statistics
3
. The 
asymptotic distributions for the statistics can be expressed in the form of  
                                               
2 Note that Levin et al. (2002) suggests that lu in first difference is insignificant at the 5% level, 
implying the variables is I(2).  Yet the superiority of the Im et al. (2003) test and the borderline nature 
of the Levin et al.’s result seems to justify treating all variables as I(1). 
3
 It is assumed that for the parametric panel test, there is a common unit root process so that it  in 
itititit yy   1  is identical across cross-sections.  The group panel test allows for individual 
unit root processes so that it  may vary across cross-sections.  The property of the parametric panel 
test and the group panel test are analogous to that of Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (1997) 
respectively.   The specification of panel t-statistics and group t-statistics is found in Table 1 in Pedroni 
(1999, p.660).    
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(0, 1) where TNk ,  is a standardized form with respect to the values 
of N and T for each statistic and the   (mean) and v (variance) are functions of the 
moments of the underlying Brownian motion.  The statistics are then compared to the 
appropriate tails of the normal distribution.  The null hypothesis is no cointegration.  
The empirical results shown in Table 2 fail to reject the null.  This implies that there is 
no long-run equilibrium relationship between unemployment and immigration and 
also between real wage rates and immigration.    
 
On the basis of the results of no cointegration, one applies the Granger-causality tests 
by differencing variables. The bivariate panel VAR (PVAR) model takes the 
following form: 
 
 



 

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N
i
iit xydy       (9) 
where y, x = lu and lrw or lmr and lrw (y  x),   = lag.  VAR is normally modelled 
by maximum likelihood estimation (or GLS) but since the regressors are identical 
across equations, the estimates are equivalent to those of OLS.  Note that in panels, 
unlike time-series, the use of OLS is only valid or consistent if the time-series 
dimension (T) is sufficiently large (Binder et al. 2005), and if T is not large enough 
the application of GMM is suggested.  For example, Cao and Sun (2006) and 
Christiansen and Goudie (2007) assume that around T = 25 is sufficiently large to 
avoid problems of inconsistency with OLS estimation of the PVAR.   On this ground, 
though T=25 in our case, since data are unbalanced panel data, we apply not only the 
OLS, but also the GMM.  Given a relatively small sample size with annual panel data, 
which might render sensitivity to the result with the choice of lag, we present three lag 
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lengths of one, two and three, rather than based on selection criteria
4
.  The GMM 
estimation involves instrument variables that are orthogonal to the disturbance terms.  
Following Binder et al. (2005), instruments used are the levels and lagged two, three 
and four periods of lu, lrw and lmr.         
 
See Table 3a for the estimates based on OLS.  The Hausman test is predominantly 
rejected in most cases, and so the fixed effects model by specifying i  is plausible.  
Although some of the LM second order indicate the presence of serial correlation, all 
the first order tests suggest the absence of serial correlation for all cases.  Where the 
null of homoskedasticity is rejected, heteroskedasticity is corrected using robust 
estimation with White’s heteroskedastic consistent t-ratios.  Table 3b presents the 
GMM estimates.  A similar diagnostic test results seem to apply to the residuals, and 
the over-identification tests indicate that the null is not rejected in all cases, 
suggesting that the instruments adopted are valid.        
 
[TABLE 3] and [TABLE 4] 
 
Granger-causality is tested based on the PVAR estimates.  See Table 4.  In the case of 
OLS, the  lmr Granger-causes  lu at all PVAR orders at least at the 10% 
significance level, whereas for the GMM, it is found to be significant at the 5% level 
at the first and second orders.  As to that  lu Granger-causes  lmr, it is significant at 
the second and first orders for the OLS and GMM respectively. The results suggest 
that causality is running in both directions from unemployment to immigration and 
                                               
4 If the number of cross sectional observations is small the results may be sensitive to lag length of the 
PVAR (Christiansen and Goudie, 2007). 
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from immigration to unemployment.  However, wages and immigration seem to be 
independent of one another.     
 
Table 3a for the VAR model based on the OLS shows that the bilateral relationship 
between unemployment and migration is negative to each other: the coefficients of 
1lmr  in the lu equation and 1lu  in the lm  equation are statistically significant 
with a negative sign.  The same results are found for the GMM estimates in Table 3b.  
 
The evidence implies that an increase in the rate of unemployment deters migration 
being broadly consistent with theoretical and empirical literature.  The absence of 
causality from wages to migration may be explained by the fact that for risk-averse 
workers, probabilities of employment may be a more important determinant of 
migration than wage rates (Treyz et al. 1993).   
 
The effect of immigration on unemployment and wages of native workers varies 
widely from study to study and varies across countries.  Our result suggests that the 
increase of migrants seem to reduce unemployment in the destination countries.  The 
expansionary impact of immigration on employment implies that migration of 
workers from the new EU does not crowd out national workers, but may have a 
positive impact on the old EU by alleviating labour market shortages supporting 
increased employment, which supports the view put forward by the European 
Commission (2006).  As to wages, the result is largely consistent with the recent 
cross-section studies by Constant (2005) for France and Zorlu and Hartog (2005) for 
the UK, the Netherlands and Norway, which shows very small migration effects on 
wages. 
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4.     Conclusion 
Employing EU information ranging from 1980 to 2004 and techniques for exploiting 
panel data this paper concludes that migration from, e.g. CEEC is inversely correlated 
with unemployment in the destination countries (EU). This conclusion is in line with 
standard theoretical predictions assuming a flexible labour market.  Importantly, the 
findings imply that the general consensus in the literature that immigrant flows have 
had little or no substantive adverse impact on the recipient labour market appears to 
apply in the EU.    
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Table 1     Panel Unit Root tests  
 
 
 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) Im, Pesaran and Shin(2003) ADF - Fisher Chi-square 
 Levels First 
differences 
Levels First differences Levels First 
differences 
lu -0.627 
[0.265] 
-1.595 
[0.055] 
-0.308 
[0.379] 
-3.467 
[0.000] 
 29.931 
 [0.270] 
 
 90.271 
 [0.000] 
 
lmr -0.632 
[0.263] 
-2.543 
[0.005] 
1.467 
[0.929] 
-3.097 
[0.001] 
 31.049 
[ 0.226] 
 
 121.11 
 [0.000] 
 
lrw 0.428 
[0.665] 
-1.936 
[0.026] 
0.003 
[0.501] 
-3.314 
[0.001] 
 25.709 
 [0.479] 
 
 112.80 
 [0.000] 
 
Null: unit root.  [ ]: prob. 
 
 
 
Table 2     Panel Cointegration tests  
 
 
 
Parametric panel t-statistics Parametric group t-statistics 
Equation (1) (lu and lmr) -0.068 -1.275 
Equation (2) (lrw and lmr) -0.143 -0.843 
Null: no cointegration.  Critical value -1.64 (5%). 
         14 
     
Table 3a     Panel VAR Model: OLS            
Dep. Var.  lu       lmr      
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 lu
1  0.410***  (5.166) 0.409*** (4.099) 0.400*** (4.773) -0.192*** (2.531) -0.228*** (3.114) -0.194*** (2.505) 
 lu-2   -0.001 (0.018) 0.108 (1.102)   -0.061 (0.589) -0.008 (0.081) 
 lu-3     -0.319*** (4.724)     -0.044 (0.473) 
 lmr-1 -0.077** (1.914) -0.095** (2.244) -0.104** (2.305) -0.003 (0.027) -0.035 (0.341) 0.042 (0.435) 
 lmr-2   0.071* (1.706) 0.059 (1.399)   -0.141** (2.087) -0.117 (1.558) 
 lmr-3     -0.019 (0.480)     -0.002 (0.028) 
 2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
Fixed test   4.387 [0.986] 30.339 [0.004] 10.359 [0.664] 23.746 [0.033] 22.682 [0.045] 16.222 [0.181] 
Hausman test 15.731 [0.000] 23.335 [0.000] 30.468 [0.000] 25.718 [0.000] 45.544 [0.000] 43.000 [0.000] 
LM serial (1) 0.315    [0.574] 0.537    [0.463] 0.533    [0.465] 0.515    [0.473] 1.839   [0.175] 0.311   [0.576] 
LM serial (2) 11.283     [0.003] 12.464      [0.002] 6.067        [0.048] 3.518       [0.172] 6.758        [0.034] 7.579        [0.023] 
LM Hetero 1.487           [0.475] 8.470        [0.076] 9.655        [0.139] 12.830      [0.002] 17.980        [0.001] 20.395       [0.002] 
Dep. Var.  lrw       lmr      
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 lrw 1  0.256*** (3.079) 0.319*** (3.427) 0.319*** (3.082) -0.006 (0.878) -0.013* (1.689) -0.016* (1.710) 
 lrw-2   -0.122 (1.244) -0.120 (1.070)   0.012 (1.083) 0.013 (1.091) 
 lrw-3     -0.080 (1.129)     -0.006 (0.735) 
 lmr-1 -0.124 (0.185) -0.185 (0.257) -0.168 (0.270) 0.091 (0.796) 0.069 (0.574) 0.051 (0.453) 
 lmr-2   0.521 (1.013) 0.140 (0.305)   -0.152 (0.974) -0.185 (1.064) 
 lmr-3     1.337** (2.099)     0.127 (1.147) 
 2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
Fixed test 68.031      [0.000] 55.699       [0.000] 41.333      [0.000] 15.913      [0.253] 14.614      [0.332] 19.714       [0.102] 
Hausman test   0.539     [0.763] 29.927 [0.000] 27.588      [0.000] 31.348      [0.000] 45.939      [0.000] 44.973      [0.000] 
LM serial (1) 1.145              [0.284] 0.966              [0.325] 1.469              [0.225] 1.318              [0.250] 1.156              [0.282] 1.198              [0.274] 
LM serial (2) 3.978            [0.136] 3.767             [0.152] 3.022             [0.220] 5.683           [0.058] 7.398           [0.025] 2.091      [0.352] 
LM Hetero 11.316      [0.003] 9.998         [0.041] 5.494        [0.482] 7.778        [0.021] 18.279        [0.001] 24.774      [0.001] 
*, ** and ***:  Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Based on 283 observations of the unbalanced panel data for the period 1980-2004 with 13 EU countries.         
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Table 3b     Panel VAR Model: GMM             
Dep. Var.  lu       lmr      
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 lu
1  0.408***  (4.628) 0.418*** (3.924) 0.422*** (4.571) -0.229*** (2.754) -0.179** (2.325) -0.192** (2.276) 
 lu-2   -0.003 (0.033) 0.118 (1.160)   -0.012 (0.106) -0.018 (0.171) 
 lu-3     -0.314*** (4.344)     -0.025 (0.244) 
 lmr-1 -0.092** (2.128) -0.093** (1.972) -0.097* (1.808) -0.056 (0.516) -0.126 (1.329) 0.097 (0.942) 
 lmr-2   0.084** (2.053) 0.033 (0.728)   -0.045 (0.632) -0.030 (0.375) 
 lmr-3     -0.018 (0.430)     -0.088 (0.871) 
 2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
Over- id. 1.991 [0.369] 18.666 [0.000] 0.764 [0.682] 1.784 [0.409] 1.008 [0.604] 5.316 [0.070] 
LM serial (1) 0.441    [0.506] 0.193    [0.660] 0.143  [0.706] 1.312    [0.252] 1.735   [0.186] 0.311   [0.576] 
LM serial (2) 15.429     [0.004] 13.794      [0.001] 5.331        [0.069] 7.427       [0.689] 2.836        [0.242] 7.579        [0.023] 
LM Hetero 1.991           [0.369] 7.438 [0.024] 8.758        [0.013] 9.173      [0.010] 7.428        [0.024] 20.395       [0.002] 
Dep. Var.  lrw       lmr      
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 lrw
1  0.479*** (6.390) 0.495*** (5.034) 0.454*** (4.392) -0.256 (0.282) -0.473 (0.432) -0.575 (0.506) 
 lrw-2   -0.011 (0.119) 0.004 (0.036)   0.673 (0.581) 1.668 (1.176) 
 lrw-3     0.026 (0.329)     -2.111** (2.059) 
 lmr-1 -0.004 (0.836) 0.004 (0.671) 0.001 (0.145) 0.099 (0.985) 0.158* (1.822) 0.142 (1.477) 
 lmr-2   -0.003 (0.693) -0.003 (0.619)   -0.040 (0.564) -0.019 (0.259) 
 lmr-3     0.001 (0.087)     0.075 (0.817) 
 2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
2  [prob.] 
Over-id. 0.436 [0.804] 1.059 [0.589] 0.262 [0.877] 1.416 [0.493] 4.581 [0.101] 3.919 [0.141] 
LM serial (1) 0.117              [0.732] 0.879            [0.348] 1.995              [0.158] 1.189              [0.276] 4.779              [0.029] 2.217              [0.346] 
LM serial (2) 0.871            [0.646] 0.735             [0.692] 5.545             [0.062] 0.347           [0.841] 5.113           [0.077] 2.095      [0.351] 
LM Hetero 4.237      [0.118] 6.042         [0.049] 6.047        [0.049] 9.397        [0.010] 6.127        [0.047] 13.189      [0.001] 
*, ** and ***:  Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.  Over-id.: Over-identification test 
Instrument variables used are lu, lmr,  and  for the order 1, lu, lmr, , , , and   for the order 2 and  lu, lmr, ,  ,   , and   
 for the order 3. 
Based on 283 observations of the unbalanced panel data for the period 1980-2004 with 13 EU countries. 
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Table 4 
 
a)     Panel Granger Causality tests based on OLS  
 
Null hypothesis PVAR 
order  
GC test 
2   F test [Prob] Results  
 lmr does not GC  lu 1  3.662    [0.055]* Reject null 
 2  9.106  4.553  [0.010]*** Reject null 
 3  7.808  2.602  [0.050]* Reject null 
 lu does not GC  lmr  1  6.409    [0.011]* Reject null 
 2  10.622  5.311  [0.004]*** Reject null 
 3  7.299  2.433  [0.062] Accept null 
 lmr does not GC  lrw 1  0.034    [0.853] Accept null 
 2  1.169  0.585  [0.557] Accept null 
 3  4.720  1.573  [0.193] Accept null 
 lrw does not GC  lmr 1  0.771    [0.379] Accept null 
 2  3.221  1.610  [0.200] Accept null 
 3  3.299  1.099  [0.348] Accept null 
 
b)     Panel Granger Causality tests based on GMM 
 
Null hypothesis PVAR 
order  
GC test 
2   F test [Prob] Results  
 lmr does not GC  lu 1  4.537    [0.033]** Reject null 
 2  8.733 4.367  [0.012]** Reject null 
 3  3.840 1.280  [0.279] Accept null 
 lu does not GC  lmr  1  7.588   [0.005]*** Reject null 
 2  5.848 2.924  [0.053]* Reject null 
 3  5.617 1.873  [0.132] Accept null 
 lmr does not GC  lrw 1  0.698   [0.403] Accept null 
 2  0.695 0.348  [0.706] Accept null 
 3  0.399 0.133  [0.940] Accept null 
 lrw does not GC  lmr 1  0.079   [0.778] Accept null 
 2  0.359 0.179  [0.836] Accept null 
 3  4.258 1.419  [0.234] Accept null 
[ ]: prob.   *, ** and ***:  Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Figure1.      Migration, output and employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Granger-Causality Tests for EU in Heterogeneous Panels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRW = Bargained real wage 
OA = Total labour force in East and West prior to migration 
KA = AB = Migration 
BRW (West) shifts to right: Employment rises by WW’ 
BRW (EAST) shifts to left: Employment falls by E’E 
Net output gain = HJW’W – FGEE’ of indeterminate sign 
Net employment gain: indeterminate sign 
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